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Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income? 





The introduction of the 2006 Norwegian shareholder income tax was announced in advance, 
and it increased top marginal tax rates on individual dividend income from zero to 28 percent. 
We document strong timing effects on dividend payout on a large panel of non-listed 
corporations, with a surge of dividends prior to 2006 and a sharp drop after. Mature firms are 
more likely to pay dividends, and high asset growth increases the probability of retaining all 
earnings. Intertemporal income shifting through the timing of dividends seems to be a drain 
on internal equity and cause increases in the corporations’ debt-equity ratios. The debt ratios 
drop sharply after the implementation of the reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The dual income tax is characterized by a progressive tax on earned income and a 
proportional tax on capital income. This tax system was first implemented in the Nordic 
countries nearly 20 years ago, and countries around the world have since then implemented 
elements of a dual income tax.
4 The dual income tax is neutral in its treatment of different 
sorts of capital income. In its pure form, it also avoids double taxation of dividends, as 
dividend receipts are tax-exempt through an imputation system. The major challenge lies with 
the taxation of small businesses. For medium and high income classes, there is a large 
difference in the marginal tax rates on capital and labour income, providing great incentives 
for business owners to participate in tax minimizing income shifting in order to re-classify 
labour income as capital income, as emphasized by Sørensen (1994), Hagen and Sørensen 
(1998), Lindthe et.al (2004), and Alstadsæter (2007).  
  The prevention of such income shifting was a major motivation behind the Norwegian 
2006 tax reform, which introduced a partial double taxation of dividends paid to individual 
domestic shareholders.
 Only the equity premium is subject to taxation under this new system. 
The normal return to the share, the so-called Rate-of-Return-Allowance, is tax exempt. We 
show in a simple setting with no uncertainty that in steady state, the shareholder income tax is 
neutral with respect to timing of dividends and capital structure of the firm. Sørensen (2005a) 
also shows that the shareholder income tax is neutral with respect to investment decisions and 
risk taking, as long as there is full loss offset.   
So, with neutrality under both the new and old tax systems, the tax reform should have 
no other effect than on the timing of dividend payments.
5 As the reform was announced in 
advance and a number of transitionary rules were implemented from 2004 and onward, 
corporations were expected to advance the distribution of profits prior to the implementation 
of the new tax rates. Following the hierarchy of Slemrod (1995), this is intertemporal income 
shifting, the least severe of agents’ behavioral responses to taxation, and should not have any 
significant effects except transitory disturbances on the financial policy of the corporations.
6 
But, as stated by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008), intertemporal income shifting affects the cash 
                                                      
4 For more on the dual tax system, see Sørensen (1994, 1998, 2005b), Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), and Boadway (2004). 
5 We would also expect some minor effects of the ratio of wage to dividends in the compensation of owners' labour effort in 
small firms where the owner also is actively involved in the day-to-day operations. An owner-manager’s choice between 
wages and dividends is analyzed by Fjærli and Lund (2001). 
6 See also Gordon and Slemrod (2000) for a broad discussion of different types of income shifting. 3 
balance of the corporation and might thus have negative effects on investments in the 
following periods. 
  In this paper we examine a panel of 75.433 Norwegian non-listed corporations’ 
dividend policy based on their annual accounting statements for the accounting years 1999-
2006. In addition, we have information on their type of owners, ownership shares, and 
owners’ received dividends. We also analyze which impact excessive dividend payments 
prior to the 2006 tax reform had on the corporations’ financial structure. We have three main 
results. First, we find strong timing effect on dividend payments, both around the temporary 
dividend tax in 2001 and around the announced and permanent shareholder income tax in 
2006. Aggregate proposed dividends in our sample increased by 82 percent the last year 
before the introduction of the shareholder income tax, and dropped by 41 percent after the 
reform. In particular, there are strong responses on the extensive margin, which are the same 
results found by Chetty and Saez (2005). But this timing effect is substantially smaller in 
firms where the owners transferred their shares to holding companies prior to 2006, as 
dividends paid to corporations are tax exempt under the shareholder income tax. Second, we 
find support for the life-cycle view of the corporation, as argued by Sinn (1991). In our 
sample, mature firms are more likely to pay dividends. High asset growth in a corporation 
increases the probability of retaining all earnings. These effects are even stronger when 
considering the probability of paying excessive dividends (proposed dividends are higher than 
profits). The very significant impact of growth on the propensity to retain all earnings 
indicates that internal funding can be of special importance for growing firms. Tax motivated 
dividend distributions could therefore have an additional cost through reduced cash holdings 
and thus reduced investment opportunities in the future, as argued by Korinek and Stiglitz 
(2008). Third, we find that intertemporal shifting of income through the timing of dividends 
drains the corporations for internal equity and increases their debt-equity ratios. This effect is 
more pronounced in the smaller corporations with concentrated ownership.
7  
  A partial double taxation of dividend income was introduced also in Finland in 2005, 
as an addition to their dual income tax system. The anticipation effects of this reform are 
analyzed in Kari, Karikallio and Pirttilä (2008). They document an increased dividend payout 
prior to the reform by firms that most likely would be affected by the new dividend tax. It 
seems like this increase in dividend payments did not come at the expense of new 4 
investments, but rather was financed partially by new debt. The effects of the dual income tax 
on related issues as taxable income, demand for debt, tax progressivity, and choice of 
business organizational form, are studied by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), Fjærli (2004), 
Thoresen (2004), Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008), and Alstadsæter and Wangen (2008) on 
Norwegian data. Similar studies are conducted on Swedish data by Selén (2002) and Hansson 
(2004), and on Finnish data by Kari (1999) and Pirttilä and Selin (2006). 
  Different theories on the corporation’s motivation for distributing dividends, as well as 
the effects of taxes, are presented in section 2 in this paper. The previous and present taxation 
of the Norwegian corporate sector are described in section 3, where also the neutrality of the 
shareholder tax is discussed. Section 4 presents the data, and in section 5 we present the 
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theories on the effects of taxes on corporations' financial policy 
 
Different views on the motives behind the corporation’s dividend payments lead to different 
conclusions regarding the effect of taxes on the corporations' financial policy. According to 
the familiar early results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
dividend policy and the source of finance are irrelevant for share value in efficient markets. 
But market imperfections, such as agency costs and taxes introduce distortions. 
  Under the agency problem of free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), firms 
increase dividend payments when they anticipate declining investment opportunities in the 
future. It is a way to control managers from investing in less profitable internal projects and 
waste cash in more mature firms with limited growth possibilities.  
  Lintner (1956) found in a survey that managers only increase dividends when they are 
sure to be able to maintain future dividend payments of this level. This is the starting point of 
the signaling view on dividend payments, where dividends can signal private information on 
profitability. Firms are reluctant to cut dividend payments, as this is perceived as a negating 
signal of rentability to the market. A large literature finds evidence that stock prices increase 
for corporations that announce dividend increases and fall when corporations announce 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 This paper focuses on possible indirect tax reform effects on investments through income shifting and consequences for 
cash balance. Anticipated tax reforms can also affect investments directly, as emphasized by Alvarez et al. (1998). 5 
dividend cuts.
8  Bernheim and Wantz (1995) argue that taxes make dividends more expensive 
as a signal. Thus the signal of profitability inherent in dividend payments is stronger in the 
presence of taxes.  
  More recent views on dividend payments are the clientele view, where investors prefer 
dividend paying stocks from behavioral explanations (see Allen and Michaely, 2003, for an 
overview), and the catering view, where managers pay dividends when dividend-paying 
stocks are in demand, and not when it is the other way round (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
  Under the so called old view (or corporate finance view) on dividend taxation, new 
share issues is the marginal source of funds. Dividend taxes in combination with corporate 
taxes impose a double taxation of dividend income and makes debt more attractive as a source 
of finance. Dividend taxes distort the investment decision of the firm and might prevent free 
allocation of capital in the economy, as argued by Harberger (1962, 1966). The corporate tax 
discriminates against investments in the corporate sector and allocates capital towards the 
non-corporate sector, implying a welfare loss through an inefficient resource allocation. It can 
also prevent the founding of new firms.  
  In contrast, under the new view (or trapped equity view) on dividend taxation 
developed by King (1974), Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), double taxation of dividends 
does not necessarily distort the firm’s investment decision. Retained earnings are the marginal 
source of finance and dividends are paid with the residual cash flow. Repurchasing of shares 
is not possible. The dividend tax is neutral regarding the marginal investment decision in 
steady state but it imposes a proportional reduction in the marked value of equity. The 
dividend tax can thus be distortionary when it comes to raising new equity capital. An 
announced dividend tax cut has no effect on dividend payments, given that is perceived as 
permanent. But if the tax cut is perceived as temporary, this will spur intertemporal income 
shifting through the timing of dividends.
9 
  The nucleous view (Sinn, 1991) builds on a life-cycle view of the firm with three 
phases; start-up, growth, and maturity. The dividend tax reduces initial investments in a start-
up-firm and slows down the growth rate, thus prolonging the middle phase in the life-cycle of 
the firm (where only retained earnings are used for financing expansion), and postponing the 
mature, dividend-paying phase. Dividend taxation is neutral when the firm is mature, in line 
with the new view, but creates distortions in growth firms, in line with the old view.  
                                                      
8 See Allen and Michaely (2003) for an overview. 
9 See Auerbach (2003) for an overview on the different views on the effect of dividend taxation on corporate policy. 6 
  Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) build on the life-cycle view of Sinn (1991) and also allow 
the firms to transfer financial assets between periods. Growth firms are assumed to be capital 
constrained and reliant on some level of cash holdings. They find that unanticipated dividend 
tax change has only small effects on aggregate investments, as investments are financed 
through retained earnings in growing firms that do not pay dividends. An announced tax 
change will on the other hand induce firms to participate in intertemporal income shifting 
through the timing of dividend payments. This will affect the firm’s cash holdings and in turn 
its investment level. They argue that even short-term timing effects can have long term real 
effects on the economy through the effect on the cash holding in credit constrained firms. 
Similarly, Gordon and Dietz (2009) and Chetty and Saez (2007) develop agency costs based 
models for the effect of dividend taxation on firm’s investments and financial policy. Gordon 
and Dietz (2009) evaluate three different theories on dividend behavior, the new view, a 
signaling model and an agency model. They conclude that the agency model corresponds 
better to stylized facts on firms and dividend behavior.   
There is a large, but inconclusive, empirical literature analyzing the effects of dividend 
tax on the firms' financial policy. Poterba and Summers (1985) find support for the old view 
on UK data, as do Hines (1996) and Poterba (2004) on US data. Bond, Devereux and Klemm 
(2007) find support for the new view on recent UK data. Auerbach and Hasset (2002) and 
Desai and Goolsbee (2004) find some support for the new view on U.S. data. Chetty and Saez 
(2005) conduct an early analysis of the 2003 US dividend tax cut, and find a large timing 
effect of dividend payments among the listed corporations that constituted their data sample. 
The rapid increase in dividend payments was stronger among firms with high levels of 
accumulated assets and firms with strong owners. As they argue in Chetty and Saez (2007), 
this is more in line with an agency cost model of dividend behavior. Auerbach and Hasset 
(2006, 2007) document that the 2003 U.S. dividend tax cut affected equity markets and firm 
valuation, with a positive effect on firm value of dividend paying firms.  
There also seems to be an overall trend that fewer firms are paying dividends. Fama 
and French (2001) find that there is a substantial decline in the proportion of US listed firms 
that pay dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2004) also find evidence that the reduction in dividends 
is primarily driven by fewer firms paying dividends. This is due to a changing composition of 
corporations, and that dividend payments are concentrated among the largest, most profitable 
listed US corporations. Some support for this is found by Denis and Osobov (2008) on 
international data. 7 
3. The Norwegian dual income tax system 
 
The Norwegian version of the dual income tax involves a flat, basic tax rate that applies to 
both corporate income, and to capital and labour income at the personal level. The basic tax 
rate that applies to all income has been fixed at 28 percent in the whole period after the 
introduction of this scheme in 1992. In addition, labour income is taxed by a progressive 
surtax, which implies that top marginal tax rates for wage incomes are substantially higher 
than the marginal tax rate on capital income. When including the employers’ social security 
contributions of 14.1 percent on wage payments, total top marginal tax rates on wage income 
were 59 percent, 65.5 percent, and 58 percent in the years 1992, 2001, and 2005, 
respectively.
10  
3.1 Taxing income from the corporate sector 1992-2005 
Dividends were tax exempt 1992-2005.
11 The exception is 2001, when a dividend tax of 11 
percent applied to all dividend receipts above a threshold. Capital gains were taxed at 28 
percent. The so-called RISK-model prevented double taxation of realized capital gains that 
originated in withheld profits. When taxable capital gains on realized shares were computed, a 
deduction was allowed for accumulated retained profits in the corporation, as these were 
already taxed at 28 percent at the corporate level. Andersson et al. (1998) discuss this in more 
detail.  
There were strong incentives to shift income from the labour income tax base to the 
capital income tax base. The split model of dual income taxation was designed to prevent this 
income shifting, and it applied to sole proprietors and corporations with more than 2/3 of 
shares held by active owners.
12 Under the split model, a return to the labour effort of the 
active owner is imputed, and this is taxed as labour income independently of whether it is 
actually paid as wages, dividends, or retained in the firm. First, the imputed return to capital is 
calculated, at an annually determined imputation rate (this has varied between 10 and 16 
                                                      
10 These employers’ social security contributions actually vary geographically between 0 and 14.1 percent, and are lower for 
employees living further away from urban centers. In this paper we only consider the normal rate of 14.1 in calculations. 
As these contributions are deductible labour costs when taxable profits on corporate level are calculated, they only account 
for additional 14.1*0.72=10.15 percentage points to total marginal tax on wage income. 
11 In principle, dividends were taxable at the capital income tax rate, 28 percent. But a full imputation system allowed 
deduction for taxes paid at the corporate level. As the corporate tax rate is also 28 percent, this meant that in practice there 
was no taxation of dividend income. 
12 An owner is characterized as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in the firm. Spouses or under-aged children 
of active owners are not recognized as passive owners. Originally, also children of age could not be considered passive 8 
percentage points) times total assets in the firm. A deduction for the human capital 
contribution to profits is calculated as 20 percent of total wage costs, with some restrictions. 
Imputed return to labour is then taxable profits net of both the imputed return to capital and 
the human capital deduction and taxable imputed return to labour are assigned to the active 
owners according to their ownership shares in the firm. If imputed return to labour is 
negative, it is forwarded for deduction against future positive imputed return to labour in the 
same corporation. The split model and the incentives for income shifting are described and 
analyzed by Hagen and Sørensen (1998), Lindhe et al. (2004), Alstadsæter (2007), 
Alstadsæter and Wangen (2008) and Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008). At the same time as 
the difference between the top marginal tax rates on labour and capital increased during the 
1990ies increased, it also became easier to legally participate in income shifting between the 
tax bases through more lenient regulations within the split model.  
As shown in figure 1, there was a substantial increase in dividend income among 
households from 1993 to 2005. Also, one can see clear timing effects as responses to the 
dividend taxes of 2001 and 2006. There was a period of strong economic growth throughout 
the 1990ies, and this accounts for part of the increased dividend payments throughout the 
period. Also, the lowering of marginal tax rates on capital income spurred savings in the 
household sector. To the extent that these savings were channeled into the corporate sector, 
this can explain some of the increase in dividends. But a lot of this dividend growth can also 
be attributed to changing economic incentives for the firms through the introduction of the 
dual income tax in 1992
13, as discussed by Alstadsæter, Fjærli and Thoresen (2006). The 
dramatic reduction of top marginal tax rates on capital income through this reform made 
retained earnings relatively more expensive as a source of finance compared to debt than 
before the 1992 tax reform. Also, the incentives to re-label labour income of the owners as 







                                                                                                                                                                      
owners. After only a couple of years that changed, enabling a tax free intergenerational transfer from parents to adult 
children through dividend payments to aged children as passive owners in the family firm. 
13 A remission of postponed taxes that released large funds in the corporations also contributed to the increase in dividends. 9 
Figure 1.   Received dividends by households in Billion NOK, 1993-2007.  
























* Preliminary figures for 2007
 
3.2 Taxing income from the corporate sector from 2006 and onward - The 
shareholder income tax 
The first warning of a tax increase in prospect came in June 2000, when the parliament 
approved a temporary tax on capital gains and dividends for the income year 2001, “to be 
replaced by a new tax system in 2002”. In 2001, the interim tax was abolished, but no new tax 
system was introduced. Instead, an expert committee was appointed early 2002. The Skauge 
Committee presented its recommendations early 2003, the government proposal came early 
2004, and transitory rules were passed on March 26, 2004. The parliament agreed to the 
reform the same year, to be implemented from January 1, 2006.  
  The shareholder income tax ensures equal tax treatment of all personal owners of 
corporations, independent of ownership composition. Only the equity premium is subject to 
taxation under this new system. The risk-free return to the share, the so-called Rate-of-Return-
Allowance, is tax exempt. The shareholder income tax applies to all income from shares, both 
dividends and capital gains. This means that the effective marginal tax rate on income from 
shares is 48.2 percent, close to the top marginal tax rate on labour income of 47.8 percent.
14  
The Rate-of-Return-Allowance (RRA) is the imputed risk-free return to the share, 
which is defined as the product of the imputation rate and the stepped-up basis of the share. 10 
The stepped-up basis of the share is the sum of its acquisition price (for shares purchased 
before 2006, special regulations apply for the imputation of this price) and all previous 
unused RRA’s. The imputation rate is set at the end of each year as an average of the after-tax 
interest rate on bonds during the year, and was 2.1 percent for 2006 and 3.3 percent for 2007. 
Dividends that exceed the RRA are taxable at the capital income tax rate. If received 
dividends are less than the RRA, the remaining is added to the imputation basis of the share 
for the calculation of future RRAs. In addition, the unused RRA for this year is forwarded and 
added to the imputed RRA the following year. The share specific RRA can not be transferred 
between different types of shares and only the person who owns the share at yearend will 
benefit from the calculated RRA for that year. At realization, the taxable capital gain from the 
share is the capital gain net of accumulated unused RRAs. Any remaining unused RRAs 
cannot be carried forward and cannot be deducted against other income. Only actual capital 
losses at realization are tax deductible (not losses that stems from unused RRAs).
 15 
The shareholder income tax only applies to Norwegian resident individuals. Dividends 
paid to corporations are tax exempt, as are corporations’ capital gains from realization of 
shares. This latter rule is the so-called Exception-model, and was implemented without 
warning on March 26, 2004, prior to the shareholder income tax.  
A transition rule ensured that if an individual shareholder sold his shares in a 
corporation to another corporation during 2005, and was compensated in the form of shares in 
this new corporation, no capital gains taxes applied. This was the so-called transition rule E, 
and the motivation for this was to equalize tax treatment of personal shareholders and 
individuals who owned shares through a holding company. Now all individual shareholders 
had the possibility to transfer their shares to a holding company without triggering any capital 
gains tax under the pre-reform regime. The shareholder income tax only applies when 
dividends or capital gains are realized by individuals. 
3.3 The neutrality of dividend and capital gains taxation  
In a simple setting where we disregard uncertainty, we will now show that both under the pre- 
and post-reform  dual income tax systems, the after-tax income of an individual investor is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 For the income year 2006. 11 
independent of whether profits are distributed or retained in the corporation, then generating a 
realizable capital gain. Also, neither of the tax systems should affect the timing of dividends 
or the corporations’ choice between debt and equity. First we describe the former system 
based on imputation credits and then the present shareholder income tax based on rate of 
return allowances.
16  
3.3.1  The dual income tax with full imputation. 
We do not include the split model in this set-up, as the imputed taxable labour income under 
the split model is calculated based on gross profit and the value of real assets, and is 
independent of whether net profits are paid as dividends or retained. Apart from the value of 
assets in place, the value, V, of a corporation immediately before the ex-dividend date is 
assumed to be the sum of the current period’s dividend payments, D, and after tax profits 
retained in the firm, π(1-τ)-D, where π is gross profits, and τ is the corporate tax rate. Assume 
that one additional unit of retained earnings increases the value of the share, and thus also 
realizable capital gains, G, by one unit. When denoting the individual’s tax payments on 
dividends and capital gains by TD  and TG , respectively, the value of the corporation can be 
expressed as 
] ) 1 [( ] [ ] [ ] [ G D G D T D T D T G T D V − − ⋅ − + − = − + − = π τ                             (1)             
The individual’s tax payments on dividends and capital gains were both based on a full 
imputation system, as described in the previous section. The imputation rate for taxable 
dividends, iD, is given by  ) 1 /( τ τ − = D i , and the nominal imputation amount for capital gains 
(deductions in capital gains for the retained after-tax profits under the RISK-model), IG, is 
given by  D IG − ⋅ − = π τ) 1 ( . Actually, the deduction IG includes all accumulated retained 
earnings in the past, but in this simple setting IG is simply equal to the current period’s 
retentions. Both dividend income and capital gains are taxed according to the capital income 
tax rate,  k t , which is identical to the corporate tax rate. Total tax payments on dividends and 
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and  
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 The mechanisms in the shareholder income tax are illustrated in Sørensen (2005a), Jacobsen (2008), and Alstadsæter, 
Fjærli and Thoresen (2006). 12 
[] [ ] 0 ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − ⋅ − − − ⋅ − ⋅ = − − ⋅ − ⋅ = D D t I D t T k G k G π τ π τ π τ .   (3) 
 
The imputation system for dividend taxation is based on the presumption that 
dividends paid should not be related to income that is not yet taxed according to the tax rules 
for income accrual. Thus, if dividends paid one year exceed after tax profits, a correction 
income of  π τ π ⋅ − − = ) 1 ( D c  is added to taxable corporate profits that year. The correction 
income is carried forward and deducted against future taxable profits in the corporation, 
provided that after tax profits minus dividends in the future is greater than or equal to the 
correction income carried forward. Thus, the correction income represents only an 
intertemporal shift in tax payments for the corporation with no permanent effect on the total 
tax liability of the firm. Note that the correction tax is remitted by the corporation, and not by 
the individual. When dividends paid exceed after tax book profits, the IG is not reduced as 
there will be an “income” of  π τ π ⋅ − − = ) 1 ( D c  added to taxable profits. As we shall show 
below in section 3.3.3, this special arrangement created a loophole in the transition from the 
imputation system to the new system. 
The full imputation of taxes paid by the corporation and the tax credit for retained 
earnings ensure that tax payments on received dividends, TD, and capital gains, TG, are both 
zero for the individual, except in special circumstances, such as windfall gains or when 
dividends are received from foreign companies. Also, the corporate tax rate equals the 
individual tax rate on interest income and interest expenses. Consequently, the after-tax return 
on savings is the same in the corporate sector and in the household sector, and the dividend 
decision is independent of taxes. 
With no double taxation of dividends and no tax on capital gains from retained profits, 
the total tax rate on equity is the same as the tax rate on interest income, and equal for all 
types of investors. Thus, under full certainty, there will be no tax-favouring of different 
sources of funds and the tax system does neither affect the corporations’ choice of debt versus 
equity nor the investors’ portfolio choice.
17  
  Finally, let us consider the investment decision. The real interest rate r represents the 
investors’ pre-tax required rate of return, and the pre-tax marginal rate of return corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16 The neutrality of the dual income tax and the shareholder income tax are also analyzed by Sørensen (1998, 2005), and by 
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) on the trade-off between human and non-human capital. 
17 The capital gains tax will reduce the equity premium, but will also reduce the after-tax risk under uncertainty. 13 
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As the corporate tax rate equals the individual tax rate on capital income, we see from (4) that 
the investment condition reduces to  r F = ' , which means that the individual’s investment 
decision is independent of taxes under the dual income tax with full imputation. 
 
3.3.2  The shareholder income tax. 
The tax rate on individual capital income and capital gains,  k t , is still equal to the corporate 
tax rate, τ , as under the full imputation system. Allowances in both taxable gains and taxable 
dividends are made for the alternative return to the investment, and the RRA is defined as 
K r ⋅
∗ , where 
∗ r is the imputation rate and K is the stepped-up basis of the share. Dividend 
payments are not taxable for the individual until they exceed the RRA. Total tax on 
shareholder income is given by T: 
] ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( [ K r t D K r D t T T T k k G D ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ = − − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ = + =
∗ ∗ τ π τ π . (5) 
 
Similar to the imputation system, the shareholder model too is based on the presumption that 
the dividends paid are already taxed at the hand of the corporation. Thus, the correction tax is 
continued after the tax reform. However, the correction tax has the same implications under 
the two systems and is relevant only for the working of the special transitional regulations that 
will be explained in section 3.3.3. 
As we see from equation (5), tax on shareholder income is independent of whether 
profits are distributed to owners as dividends or retained in the corporation and generating a 
realizable capital gain. 
The shareholder income tax is also neutral regarding the timing of dividends, as we 
clearly see by considering this in a simple two-period setting. Assume that first period profits 
are not paid in full as dividends, and dividend payments are less than the RRA, such that 
K r D ⋅ <
∗
1 . The remaining profits,  0 1 1 > − D π , are saved in the firm at the real interest rate, 
r, until the next period and then paid out together with the earned after-tax interest. For 
simplicity, assume that no profit is generated in the second period. No shareholder income tax 14 
applies in period 1, and the individual can carry forward the unused RRA with interest, and 
this is given by  ) 1 ( ) ( 1
∗ ∗ + ⋅ − ⋅ r D K r . This unused RRA is then deducted from taxable 
dividends (or capital gains) next year, since the unused RRA is added to the second period 
stepped-up basis of the share, and to total RRA in the second period as well. Total income, Y, 
of the individual after two periods is then given by  
[]
[]
[] {} ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
) ( ) 1 ( 1
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π τ    (6) 
 
The first line of (6) is the second period value of dividends paid in the first period. The second 
line represents first period retained earnings that have generated after-tax interest income in 
the firm and that are distributed as dividends in the second period. The third line represents 
the individual’s total tax payments on received dividends in the two periods. No dividend 
taxes apply in the first period, as dividends are less that the RRA. The first part of line three 
of (6) is dividend tax payments in period 2 if all dividends were subject to the dividend tax. 
But the accumulated rate-of-return allowance is tax exempt, and total second period RRA is 
represented by the tax credit in the second part of the expression in the third line. As is seen 
from equation (7) below, the individual’s total income is independent of the timing of 
dividend payments,  0 / 1 = dD dY , as long as the imputation rate is the after-tax interest rate 
and the corporate tax rate equals the capital income tax rate, 
∗ = ⋅ − r r ) 1 ( τ  and  k t = τ :  
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So, the net value of the stream of dividends is independent of the timing of dividends under 
the shareholder income tax. Since only the returns in excess of the after tax interest rate is 
subject to the tax, the investor will also be indifferent between holding debt and holding 
equity, from a pure tax point of view. 
  As shown by Sørensen (2005a), the shareholder income tax is neutral with respect to 
investment decisions and risk taking, as long as there is full loss offset. He also shows that the 
RRA in combination with the stepped-up basis of the share ensures neutrality with respect to 
financing by new equity versus debt. 15 
3.3.3   The transition from the imputation system to the RRA system and incentives for 
intertemporal income shifting 
Contrary to the steady state financing decisions under each of the two tax systems, the 
transition from the imputation based system to the new system based on RRA implies 
temporary tax incentives for shifting income between the two periods. Since the average tax 
rate in the individual investor’s dividend income after the 2006 tax reform approaches the 
marginal rate of about 48 percent while the average and marginal tax rates before the reform 
was 28 percent, stock-owners would wish to have as much as possible of their planned 
dividends taxed before the tax increase came into effect. This is particularly true if the 
indivudals expected a further increase in the tax on shareholder income in the future, such as 
the introduction of a general dividend tax through the removal of the RRA.  
In order to better understand the incentives to shift income between periods, we will 
now compare total taxes on profits distributed as dividends on corporate and personal level 
before and after the reform and we explain two sources of tax arbitrage. These are arbitrage 
by changes in the cash holdings of corporations and arbitrage by changes in the debt ratios. 
Also, we will explain one particular loophole related to the transition regulations. To simplify, 
we disregard the active owner’s choice between paying wages or dividends and assume that 
the owner-manager initially is rewarded by dividends. We thus assume that all profits, π, are 
distributed as dividends.  
Tax arbitrage by changes in the optimal level of cash balances of capital constrained 
firms 
This type of arbitrage is explained by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008), where changes in the 
firms’ optimal level of cash on hand leads to temporary increases or reductions in the stream 
of dividends out of the corporate sector. Their model is based on the assumption that owners 
discount cash holdings within firms at a higher rate than cash holdings outside the firms 
because of agency concerns. Another assumption is that it is costly or difficult for 
corporations to instantaneously raise new external capital, for example due to asymmetric 
information between firms and outside investors and lending institutions.
18 Consequently, 
corporations will have to rely on working capital to finance investments and the optimal level 
of cash holdings is determined by a trade off between the value of cash on the hand of the 
firm, represented by the future after-tax profits from random investment opportunities, and the 
value of cash on the hand of the shareholders. The latter depends on the current average tax 16 
on dividend receipts, while the former depends on the future tax rates. As long as the dividend 
tax rates are constant, the optimal cash holding is in steady state and independent of the tax 
rate on dividends. However, if dividend tax rates are expected to increase in the near future, 
firms will reduce the level of cash balances in order to have dividends taxed at the current low 
tax rates rather than after the tax increase. This will also reduce the firms’ investments prior to 
the tax increase. Thus, the major effect of the tax arbitrage is that funds are shifted out of the 
corporate sector and one would expect to observe a negative correlation between dividend 
payments and corporations’ growth rates after the announcement of a tax increase
19. 
Tax arbitrage by borrowing 
Being based on asymmetric information between insiders (management) and outsiders, the 
Korinek– Stiglitz approach is more relevant for the behavior of large, widely held 
corporations that rely on the capital market and are subject to these capital market 
imperfections and agency problems. However, in many firms there will be a “private line” 
between the management and a dominant owner or an owner group that resolves the agency 
problems. A substantial part of the corporate sector consists of closely held corporations 
where the owner(s) and the management are one and the same. In a closely held corporation, 
dividends can be taken out of the firm at the low tax rate and then immediately reinvested as 
new equity that can be repaid to the owners at a later point in time (repayment of original 
equity is normally tax exempt). 
 
In this section we focus on intertemporal income shifting in an owner-managed firm through 
borrowing. Assume that the shareholder maximises the present value of after-tax dividends in 
period 1, which is the last period of the old tax system with no tax on dividends, plus period 2, 
which is the first period of the new tax system with a tax on dividends above the RRA.  Also 
assume that the shareholder normally would receive dividends  K r D ⋅ >
∗
2  after the tax 
reform, named period 2. This means that the shareholder expect to have a positive taxable 
dividend income in period 2, in other words D2 can be interpreted as dividends that exceeds 
the RRA in period 2. Denote the personal tax rate on interest income and on dividends after 
the tax reform by tk and the corporate tax rate by τ, as in equation (5) above. Before the tax 
reform, in period 1, the maximum dividend that can be paid out is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Myers and Majluf (1984). 
19 For further details of the model, we refer the reader to Korinek and Stiglitz (2008). 17 
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In expression (8), M1 denotes cash on hand after investments are made in period 1 and 
includes this period’s after tax profits, B1 denotes additional debt beyond the investment 
needs in period 1 and Tπc denotes the temporary tax on correction income. As explained 
above, Tπc is positive if dividends are paid out of income that is not yet taxed by the tax-
defined rules for income accrual, and it will be reversed in the future (period 2) when 
dividend payments are reduced sufficiently below after-tax profits. In period 2, the loan B1 
plus interest expenses are repaid by retained profits and the correction tax is negative. The 
maximum net dividend in excess of the RRA is  
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Given a total budget constraint of M1 + π2(1-τ), the period 1 present value of maximum total 
dividends in the two periods is  
2 1 D D D ⋅ + = β ,         ( 1 0 )    
where β is the discount factor [1 + (1-tk) r]
-1.  Provided that all additional borrowing in 
period 1 is used to finance additional dividends (for a given level of investments), the effect 
on D from borrowing is given by 
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In (11), the tax rate τπc takes the value τ if the dividend payment in period 1 triggers correction 
tax, zero otherwise. The intuition of (11) is that one additional unit of dividends paid in period 
1 reduces gross dividends in period 2 by one plus the after-tax interest expenses. Due to the 
dividend tax, net dividends in period 2 is only reduced by (1-tk) times the gross dividends. In 
addition, there will eventually be a cost related to the negative tax credit associated with a 
possible correction tax. The after-tax value of this cost is increased by the discount factor β 
and by the dividend tax (provided that the correction tax refund in period 2 is paid out to the 
owners).  
 18 
Since tk=τ, (11) reduces to 
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Initially, the owners can save the entire dividend tax of tk by shifting income from period 2 to 
period 1 by borrowing. This implies that investments are financed by debt rather than equity. 
However, increasing period 1 dividends beyond period 1 taxable income can lead to a 
correction tax that is refunded later, in period 2. The correction tax refund increases the tax 
base for period 2 dividend taxation when paid out. So, for the owners the net after tax value of 
the correction tax is higher than the after-tax value of the correction tax refund. On the other 
hand, taxation of interest income reduces the after-tax discount rate and increases the present 
value of the refund. The expression (12) is always positive even when there is a correction 
tax, and the tax arbitrage should continue to the D2 equals the RRA, or to a point where it will 
be prevented by non-tax legal regulations or capital market constraints.  
 
Tax arbitrage by utilizing legal loopholes 
The main purpose of the tax reform was to stop income shifting between the labour and 
capital income tax bases without worsening the conditions for investment and economic 
growth. Thus, the corporate sector was given generous transition rules, such as the 
opportunity to organize investment activities in tax-exempt holding companies. Another 
transition rule allowed the tax-payers to add the imputation amount IG for capital gains (see 
the discussion of equations (2) and (3) above) to the starting value for the base for calculation 
of the RRA. Increasing dividends before the tax reform reduces IG proportionally and this 
transition rule was intended to make it unnecessary for corporations and owners to withdraw 
previously earned and taxed equity from the from the corporations just to insert it again the 
next day as new equity and as such a part of the RRA calculation base. Instead, the earned 
equity, represented by the imputation amount IG, could be put directly into the base for 
calculation of RRA. However, due to the interaction with the correction tax arrangement, a 
special loophole emerged as the full details of the shareholder income tax were revealed for 
the tax planners during 2004. The loophole works as follows:   
 19 
As explained above, when dividends exceed taxable profits, the corporation is assigned a 
correction income of π τ π ⋅ − − = ) 1 ( D c . The calculated correction income is considered 
taxable income, so the capital gains imputation amount changes by the amount 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − = Δ π τ π τ D D IG . So, beyond the point π τ ⋅ − = ) 1 ( D , further dividend 
payments will not reduce the IG and the base for the calculation of RRA. However, when 
inserted back into the firm, the additional dividends will increase the starting value for the 
RRA-base and in this way, the previously earned equity is used twice to increase the base for 
the RRA
20. Similar to the borrowing arbitrage in (12) above, there will be a present-value cost 
from this operation related to the correction tax, but the net gain from this transaction is still 
positive.   
 
3.3.4  Summary of income shifting incentives 
While the cash balance effect predicts a negative impact of the tax reform 
announcement on growth, the incentives inherent in (12) should lead to an increase in the debt 
ratios of firms from the announcement of the tax reform to its implementation. Afterwards, 
both dividends and debt should decline. Due to the loophole related to the interaction of 
correction income, imputation credit and the transition rule, one should expect to se a 
particularly strong increase in the occurrences of dividends in excess of taxable profits in 
2004, which is the final accounting year before the tax reform, and an increase in new equity 
rather than new debt in the accounting year 2005 due to reinvestment of dividends. 
The anticipation of an increase in future tax rates on dividend income thus involve 
several types of incentives that could lead to different sorts of accommodation. First, 
dividends should increase from 2001 to 2005, and one should see frequent payments of 
dividends in excess of after tax profits. Debt ratios should also increase from the accounting 
years 2001 to 2004. Second, one should see particularly frequent occurrences of dividends 
beyond profits in 2004, followed by an increase in new equity in 2005. Third, dividends and 
debt ratios should drop from 2005 and onwards, and internal (earned) equity should 
correspondingly increase sharply. Finally one should see a negative correlation between 
dividend payments and asset growth, due to the Korinek – Stiglitz effect. However, such a 
                                                      
20 According to a official statement from the tax authorities, the dividends did not need to be actually paid out, only set aside 
and then converted to new equity. Thus no liquidity was needed as long as the firm could render probable that it was solid 
enough that it could have borrowed the funds needed. 20 
negative correlation could also be explained by the view that growing corporations generally 
prefer retained earnings. 
4 Empirical analysis 
In this section we examine the dividend policy of the firms prior to the tax reform and just 
after its implementation, and the implications of dividend policy for financial structure. Two 
key subjects are addressed: First, we look at effects on dividend policy: Did the 
announcement of a coming tax reform around 2001-2002 lead to intertemporal income 
shifting among corporations mainly owned by households? How did these firms respond to 
the announcement of the 2006-reform and later to the implementation of this reform?  
Second, we examine how responses in dividend policy affected firms’ financial structure. Did 
excess dividend payments by income shifters cause changes in firms’ debt ratios or were 
foregone internal equity replaced by new equity injections? Are there indications that excess 
dividend payments may have come at the expense of growth, i.e. that valuable investment 
opportunities may not have been undertaken, as suggested by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008)?   
Chetty and Saez (2005) point out that mean dividends to a large extent are driven by 
few top tax payers, which could make statistical inference about the dividend policy difficult 
from a small sample. They therefore look upon initiations and terminations of dividend 
payments on the extensive margin, and on changes in dividends paid by dividend paying 
firms on the intensive margin. With our data that covers more than half of the corporate 
sector, this is not a major problem. In our analysis we look at initiations, terminations and 
dividend changes as in Chetty and Saez (2005), but we also analyze dividends in terms of 
zero vs. positive payments and the frequency of dividends in excess of net after-tax profits.  
If excess payments were high prior to the reform and/or there are alternative ways to 
distribute such as repayment of the original capital or loans given by shareholders, the 
transition period may take some more time and dividends would grow only slowly the first 
years after the reform. Our data does not cover a sufficiently long period to tell how dividend 
policy will be like after the reform. 
  Regarding the question whether excess dividend payment increases the propensity to 
become capital constrained or not, this needs to be examined by an analysis of the investment 
behaviour in corporations over a sufficiently long period. This is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. What we examine here is whether distributed profits are replaced by new 21 
equity or by debt, and whether there is a negative correlation between excess dividend 
payments and asset growth. Of course, such a negative correlation does not prove that 
dividends come at the expense of growth, but would give an indication of the importance of 
retained earnings as a source of funds for growing firms. The importance of retained earnings 
and sufficient financial slack is a necessary condition for capital constraints to be a possible 
obstacle for investments. No negative correlation between dividends and growth would 
indicate that firms can easily finance growth by external funds (debt or new share issues). 
  As discussed earlier, there are two simultaneous income shifting incentives inherent in 
the announced dividend tax. First, the incentive to shift income between periods and to pay 
extraordinary dividends in the years prior of 2006. Second, the reduced incentive to shift 
income between tax bases with the introduction of the shareholder income tax, that is, from 
the labour income tax base to the capital income tax base. The first effect is the focus of this 
paper. We do not have information on owner’s wage payments to themselves. But, we would 
expect owners to pay more wages after 2006. This since the difference in the marginal tax 
rates in labour and capital income decreases, and also since there is an additional pension 
motive for receiving wage payments, as documented by Fjærli and Lund (2001). 
4.1 Data 
The empirical documentation is based on two major data sources. The Accounting Register 
contains figures from the profit and loss statement and the balance sheet, and proposed 
dividends for the period 1999-2006. The Shareholder Register links corporations with each 
domestic owner (corporate or individual) and contains information of ownership 
(identification number and number of shares) and dividends paid. In principle, both data 
sources cover the entire population of corporations and owners. However, the Shareholder 
Register is relatively new, being established in 2004, and the first year is not complete.  
It is important to be aware of the differing definitions in these two data sources. In the 
Accounting Register, all figures refer to the accounting year. Dividends for year t are 
proposed dividends, payable in year t+1. This can deviate substantially from dividends 
actually paid in year t+1, which are proposed dividends in year t plus extraordinary dividends 
in year t+1. In the Shareholder Register, all figures refer to the income year. That means that 
dividends in year t are actual total received dividends in year t. Thus, dividends paid and 
reported in the Shareholder Register in 2006 must be compared to the proposed dividends of 22 
the Accounting Register in 2005, and these two figures will not be identical. Dividends 
received by households as displayed in figure 1 corresponds to total dividends paid from the 
Shareholder register. 
As documented by Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008) and Alstadsæter and Wangen 
(2008), the pre-2006 dual income tax spurred tax-minimizing income shifting through the 
choice of organizational form. To avoid noise in the data due to entry and exit of firms, we 
rely on balanced panel data. This means that we only include firms that are present in the 
Accounting Register in the whole period of 1999-2006.  
As discussed in section 2, there are several theories on the motives for corporation's 
dividend payments. Corporations are explicitly or implicitly assumed to be large and publicly 
traded, with many shareholders. Norwegian corporations listed on the stock exchange are to a 
large extent owned by institutions or the Government, as documented by Baker et al. (2006), 
while there is a much larger share of individual owners in non-listed corporations. This is 
clearly seen from table 1. In 2004, households received only 6.6 percent of total dividend 
payments from listed corporations, while the corresponding number was 45 percent for non-
listed corporations. The shareholder income tax of 2006 only applies to dividend payments to 
individuals, and should thus have a greater impact on dividend payments in non-listed 
corporations. Another factor is the income shifting aspect between different types of 
compensation; in smaller corporation with concentrated ownership and no clear separation 
between ownership and management, one would expect tax favored dividends to be used to 
compensate the owner-manger's labour effort instead of wages prior to 2006. The introduction 
of the shareholder income tax makes such re-labeling of income more expensive, and we 
expect both that these owner-managers accelerate dividend payments prior to 2006, and that 
they pay less dividends as a substitution for wages after the reform. In addition, Baker et al. 
(2006) find that taxes seem to play a minor role in the dividend decision of managers of 
Norwegian listed corporations. All these factors mean that we expect to see less pronounced 
timing responses of dividend payments to the announced 2006 shareholder income tax in 
larger, listed corporations. And as is clearly shown in table 1, the majority of timing responses 
to the shareholder income tax seem to come in the non-listed sector and especially in dividend 
payments to households. We thus exclude publicly traded corporations from the sample.  
In order to identify non-listed corporations with concentrated ownership, we rely on 
information from the Shareholder Register in 2004. We thus also exclude firms not present 
there. This leaves us with a panel of 75,433 corporations that spans 8 years, 1999-2006. This 23 
constitutes 59 percent of total corporations in 1999, and 52 percent of total corporations in 
2005. 51 percent of the corporations in our sample had concentrated ownership in 2004, 
defined as being fully owned by less than 5 personal owners. This means that we have a panel 
of fairly mature firms at the introduction of the dividend tax in 2006. 
 
Table 1: Total, nominal dividends received, by share marketplace, shareholder sector and year. 
Million NOK.  Source: Statistics Norway, Shareholder register. 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
From listed corporations 
All sectors  28 275  36 019  44 734  53 750 
General 
government  9 889  14 826  20 327  22 444 
Financial 
corporations  4 286  3 938  4 194  4 324 
Non-financial 
corporations  4 957  4 261  4 179  8 193 
Households*  1 869  2 488  1 899  2 170 
Rest of the world  7 025  9 909  13 843  16 082 
From non-listed corporations 
All sectors  137 140  221 534  137 794  163 688 
General 
government  2 741  3 324  3 847  4 761 
Financial 
corporations  2 355  3 205  8 183  7 870 
Non-financial 
corporations  41 195  72 239  68 164  91 593 
Households*  61 664  101 001  4 929  13 788 
Rest of the world  28 365  40 704  52 490  45 059 
* Including non-profit institutions serving as households. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics  
There were strong timing effects in dividend payments prior to the introduction of the 2006 
shareholder income tax, as shown in figure 1 and table 1. We find the same effect in our panel 
of closely held corporations. As is seen in table 2, there is a surge in proposed dividends in 
2004, payable in 2005. Proposed dividends increased by 82 percent from 2003 to 2004, with a 
return to the 2003-level in 2005. The increase in total dividend payments in 2005 is in fact 
even greater, as extraordinary dividend payments are not registered here. But at the same 24 
time, this was a period of strong economic expansion, and the corporations had a dramatic 
increase in profits, such that one might argue that a 82 percent increase in proposed dividends 
is not that unusual when aggregate profits increased by 116 percent. More remarkable is then 
the dramatic drop of 41 percent in proposed dividends in 2005, payable in 2006, when 
aggregate profits increased by 33 percent. 
  The combination of the so-called transition rule E (which rendered an optional capital 
gains tax exemption at the realization of shares to a corporation as long as the compensation is 
in form of shares in this other corporation), tax exemption for dividends paid to corporations 
as owners from March 26, 2004, and no tax on dividends until January 1
st 2006 provided 
firms strong incentives to realize capital gains and distribute earnings as tax exempt dividends 
during the accounting year of 2004. This probably is some of the explanation for the extreme 
increase in corporate profits from 2003 to 2004.   
Table 2. Selected nominal aggregate accounting figures, in Mill. NOK, for our balanced panel of 
non-listed and non-publicly traded corporations. 75,433 corporations. 
Year Net  profit  Proposed 
dividends *  Assets  Percentage 
dividend payers 
1999  64 402  41 326  1 759 394  36 
2000  84 707  38 897  2 016 694  30 
2001  61 855  59 510  2 164 692  36 
2002  56 698  68 126  2 177 738  40 
2003  81 052  75 303  2 231 473  41 
2004  175 005  137 400  2 352 270  48 
2005  233 351  81 591  2 573 134  9 
2006  272 091  86 711  2 792 568  19 
*Remember that total dividends paid in year t are proposed dividends in year t-1 plus extraordinary dividend payments in 
year t. 
Source: Statistics Norway, Accounting Register. 
 
 
The above factors also have contributed to a changing ownership structure. 
Considering the total of Norwegian corporations, the number of corporations that were fully 
directly owned by households decreased by 18 percent from 2004 to 2006. In 2004, the 
personal ownership share of total number of shares was 71 percent for all corporations, while 
this had decrease to 59 percent in 2006. More interestingly, personal owners held 87 percent 
of the shares in corporations that paid dividends to households in 2004. Personal ownership 
had decreased to 45 percent for these same corporations in 2006. 25 
The reduction in dividends after the implementation of the reform is expected and can 
be explained by two factors. One is the pure timing effect, as the corporations accelerate their 
dividend payments prior to the reform. This is only a transitory effect. The other reason is that 
closely held corporations either find substitutes for dividend payments such as hiding 
consumption expenditures into the operating expenses of their firm or that they believe that 
tax rates will drop again in the future. In the meanwhile, the corporation is used more or less 
as a savings box. This is a more permanent effect.  
Dividends do not disappear completely. Dividend payments to foreigners and to 
corporations are tax exempt, such that one would expect an increase in the use of holding 
companies and dividend payments to corporations, as also is seen in table 1. But as seen in 
table 2, these dividend payments are concentrated among few firms after the reform. Only 9 
and 19 percent of the corporations in our panel had proposed dividends payable in 2006 and 
2007, respectively, while 48 percent of the corporations had proposed dividends payable in 
2005. 
Table A.4 in the appendix shows the number and fraction of dividend paying firms 
that increase their dividends by more (less) than 20 percent from the previous year, for the 
entire sample and for closely held corporations. It appears that given the decision to pay 
dividends in two subsequent periods, the nominal distributions change according to the tax 
motives both in 2000 and in 2004-2005. Among the closely held corporations, almost 50 
percent increased the dividend payments by more than 20 percent in 2004, and about 67 
percent reduced dividends in 2005. However, the most prominent effect of the 2006 tax 
reform is obviously a strong reduction in the fraction of firms paying dividends, as is 
demonstrated in tables A.1 and A.2. The fractions of dividend paying closely held 
corporations decreased strongly in 2000 and 2005. Between 2000 and 2004, the percentage of 
firms paying excess dividends increased from 6 to 31 among closely held corporations, with 
close to zero firms proposing to pay excess dividends payable in 2006. There is also a steady 
increase in dividend paying corporations during the period, with a sudden drop in 
corporations proposing dividends in 2005, payable in 2006. As much as 52 percent of closely 
held corporations terminated the proposing of dividends in 2005. 
As indicated by table 3 below, there is a clear tendency for debt-asset ratios to 
increase in the years prior to the reform in small corporations and in closely held corporations. 
In the accounting year 2004, when dividends payments peaked, the debt-asset ratios peaked 
too, indicating that internal equity to a large extent were replaced by debt. After the sharp 26 
drop in dividend payments from the accounting year 2005, we see a rapid decline in the debt-
asset ratios in smaller and closely held corporations. 
Table 3.  Debt-asset ratios 2000 – 2006. Corporations ranked descending by total assets. 
 
Year  All corporations  5th decile  10th decile  Closely held 
corporations 
2000  0.58 0.74 0.57 0.58 
2001  0.59 0.76 0.58 0.61 
2002  0.59 0.80 0.57 0.65 
2003  0.57 0.79 0.54 0.67 
2004  0.64 0.83 0.62 0.71 
2005  0.61 0.73 0.60 0.59 
2006  0.60 0.69 0.59 0.54 
4.3 Dividend policy: Extensive margin 
 
Our empirical set up is based on the theoretical models by Sinn (1991) and Korinek and 
Stiglitz (2008), where firms start with an initial issue of shares and then grow entirely by 
internal funds in the first stage. No dividends are paid until the final stage, when each firm 
reaches its steady state path. Taxes enter the dividend decision through the intertemporal 
income shifting motive, as discussed in section 3.4.   
We are mainly concerned with firms owned by individuals, and in particular closely 
held firms. In this setting, closely held firms are defined as being fully owned by 5 or less 
owners. We suppose that owner-managers are impatient in the sense that they discount their 
dividend income with a subjective discount factor which is smaller than the market discount 
factor. Typically, this occurs when individuals expect their income to grow, but face credit 
constraints that limit their opportunity to borrow against their future income prospects.
21 On 
the other hand, capital constrained firms with limited access to the capital market may be 
forced to keep some financial slack in the firm, in order to be able to undertake valuable 
investment opportunities. Both the existence of imperfect capital markets and the financially 
constrained owner’s demand for dividend payments imply that firms are capital constrained in 
equilibrium. 
                                                      
21 In widely held firms, low discount factors for future dividends are explained by agency theories: Shareholders are afraid 
that selfish managers will spoil the means on bad projects if they are allowed to keep too much of the profits within the 
firm. 27 
Empirical model 
Define VR as the increments to the owners’ value function from the alternative retain all 
profits, and VD as the value added from the alternative to pay the dividend D
22. D may 
possibly come at the expense of real investments or force the firm to increase the share of 
costly external financing.  
Following MacKie-Mason (1990), we define the relative incremental value of retention rather 
than payout, V, by 
V=VR-VD=x’βR+ξR- x’βD+ξD= x’β+ξ ,  ξ  ~N (0, σ
2)   (13) 
VR and VD are not observable, but we observe the corporation’s choice given by Yit=1 if the 
firm i in period t retain all of its profits and Yit=0 otherwise. The probit model to be estimated 
then rests on the assumption that pr(Y=1) = pr (V>0)
23, or  
pr(Yit=1|xit)=pr(ξ <x’β)          ( 1 4 )  
The estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximum likelihood. The x’s are listed in 
table 4 below. 
Table 4. Regressors and their expected impact on the decision to retain all earnings 







Dummy, Growth phase, defined as book value 2006/Book value 1999 > 2 
 
Mature 
  -  Dummy, “Phase 2”. Mature firm defined as age > 10 years 
 
Neg 





+  Time dummy, Dividends are taxable this accounting year (the following 
income year)  
 
d01 




-  Time dummy, Skauge committee appointed (tax reform announcement 
effect) 
d03 




- -  Time dummy, tax reform announcement effect continues +last chance to 
pay tax exempt dividends 
d05 
+  Time dummy, dividends taxable this accounting year (the following 




-  Time dummy year=2005 multiplied by dummy for change in ownership 
from personal to corporate (the transitional rule E)
*) 
d06  
  + Dividends  taxable 
d06O 
 
-  Dummy year=2006 multiplied by dummy change in ownership from 
personal to corporate (the transitional rule E)
*) 
 
*) The reference category for ownership is firms that initially are owned by individuals in 2004 and remain owned by individuals. 
In the regressions on the entire sample, which also include corporations that are owned by other corporations, we also add a 
dummy for firms that remain owned by corporations (before and after the reform), d05C and d06C. 
                                                      
22 Besides being an important assumption in the corporation life cycle set-up in Sinn (1991), it is an empirical fact that the 
dividend decision often involves a discrete choice, as is evident also in our Norwegian data. The amount  paid as dividends 
is considered exogenous in this stylized model, and will in general depend on profits, investment opportunities and the cost 
of external financing.  
23 This is identical to the revealed preference restriction in MacKie-Mason (1990). 28 
The model is estimated using different representations of Y:  
1.  Dividends paid vs. not paid.  
2.  Excess dividends paid vs. not paid. Excess dividends are defined as 
dividends>book profits. 
3.  Dividend initiation (from zero to positive dividends).  
4.  Dividend termination (from positive to zero).  
In the first two specifications, the reference year is 1999, while the reference year is 2000 in 
specification 3 and 4.  Separate regressions are performed on the total sample and on closely 
held firms. A corporation is defined as closely held if it is 100 percent owned by 5 or less 
individuals in the year 2004. 
Results 
 
We concentrate the following discussion of the results of the probit regressions on closely 
held corporations
24, because this group seems to show the strongest response to timing 
incentives of the announced dividend tax. These results are reported in table 5 below. Similar 
results are obtained (and reported in table A.4 in the appendix) for all corporations in our 
panel.  
 
Table 5. Results of probit analysis. Closely held corporations,  
Number  of observations=302956. 
 














Log likelihood:    
-86181.1 







Intercept  0.126 0.007 1.138 0.009  -1.787 0.010  -1.428 0.008 
Grow  0.164 0.007 0.231 0.009 0.082 0.009  -0.069 0.009 
Mature  -0.201 0.006  -0.179 0.007  -0.011 0.007 0.104 0.007 
Neg  3.50 0.093  3.28 0.222  -2.447 0.109  -0.857 0.015 
d00  0.230  0.010  0.396  0.014 - - - - 
d01  -0.006 0.010  -0.183 0.012 0.793 0.012  -0.096 0.012 
d02  -0.148 0.010  -0.498 0.011 0.707 0.013 0.007 0.012 
d03  -0.132 0.010  -0.453 0.011 0.583 0.013 0.154 0.011 
d04  -0.357 0.010  -0.697 0.011 0.821 0.012  -0.060 0.012 
d05  1.816 0.015 1.535 0.028  -0.893 0.032 1.526 0.010 
d05O  -1.232 0.069  -0.927 0.110 0.447 0.175  -0.054 0.064 
d06    0.960 0.011 0.683 0.015 0.730 0.013  -0.910 0.021 
d06O  -0.765 0.065  -0.359 0.091 0.277 0.072 0.822 0.097 
 
                                                      
24 Defined as closely held in the accounting year 2004. 29 
The estimated parameters reported in table 5 are highly significant and show the 
expected signs. Besides giving support to the view that anticipated tax changes cause 
intertemporal income shifting, our findings show an extremely strong response in dividend 
policy after the implementation of the reform. The model set-up with stylized life-cycle 
behaviour of firms appears to be fairly realistic, with high asset growth increasing the 
probability of zero dividends and with mature firms being more likely to pay dividends. The 
propensity to pay excess dividends shows the same pattern. Besides their self-contained 
significance as they give some support to the life-cycle theories of corporate financing 
behaviour, the growth and mature variables also serve as control variables. It is important to 
be aware that the observed time trend in dividend payments in a balanced panel of firms could 
capture both tax-motives and natural changes due to more and more firms becoming “mature” 
as time passes. We control for this effect by the dummy variable for maturity. The very 
significant impact of growth on the propensity to retain all profits indicates that retained 
earnings can be of special importance for the funding of growing firms. Tax motivated 
dividend distributions could therefore have an additional cost through capital constraints.  
Second, the time-dummies show that the propensity of positive dividend payments, 
payment of excess dividends and dividend initiations decrease in periods with tax on 
dividends (accounting year 2000 and in particular 2005) and increase after the announcement 
of the 2006 tax reform. Terminations show the opposite pattern. Indeed, the responses in the 
accounting year 2005 were so strong that it gives reason to speculate whether the owners of 
the corporations really perceive the reform as neutral with respect to the dividend decisions. 
However, as we will see in the next section, repayment of original (external) equity may serve 
as a substitute for dividend payments, at least for some period.
25  
Third, in the cases where the owners have utilised the transitional rule that allowed 
tax-exempt transfer of shares to a tax-exempt holding company, the tax sensitivity of dividend 
payments, initiations and terminations becomes much lower (the d05O and d06O variables). 
When including the entire panel in the regressions, the dummy variable for being owned by a 
corporation during the entire period also moderate the tax sensitivity (table A.4).  
Part of the reduction in dividend payments in closely held corporations after the tax 
reform could be due to managing owners substituting wages for dividends after the 
introduction of the shareholder income tax. This effect is documented by Fjærli and Lund 
(2001) on the Norwegian 1992 tax reform. We do not have information on this in our data. 30 
But as we will show in the following section, the increase in assets after the reform indicates 
that most reduction in dividend payments are due to increased corporate saving.  
4.4 Implications of dividend policy for capital structure 
The probit regressions reported above indicate that there is a clear negative relationship 
between asset growth and the propensity to pay dividends. This negative relationship is even 
more pronounced when we look at the propensity to pay dividends in excess of book profits. 
However, it is hard to tell empirically whether excessive dividend payments constrain growth 
or whether firms with few growth opportunities choose to pay more dividends.  If leakage of 
working capital through dividend distributions is not replaced by new funds, there is a 
possibility that tax motivated excessive dividend payments could temporarily confine 
investments. On the other hand, if foregone internal funds are replaced by debt or equity, it is 
less likely that intertemporal income shifting have important real effects. The replacement of 
internal funds by debt vs. equity is the other issue we investigate.  
From the discussion in 3.3.3 above it is clear that without the rate-of-return allowance 
(RRA), replacement of internal equity by external funds in the transitional phase should be in 
the form of low-taxed debt rather than high-taxed equity, except for the accounting year 2005. 
With the RRA, business owners should be indifferent between debt and equity. The details of 
the new tax system was not public knowledge until the government’s proposal in early 2004, 
so if the owners just expected some kind of a tax increase on shareholder income, one should 
expect a decrease in internal equity and increase in the supply of debt prior to the reform, 
causing debt-asset ratios to rise. 
Tables A.5 and A.6 in the appendix provide tests of the differences in financial 
structure between firms with zero dividends and firms with positive dividends. The 
difference–in differences estimates comes with 95 percent confidence intervals annual change 
in debt-asset ratios, for the entire sample and for closely held firms. Also, each of these 
groups is categorized by size, using book value as a control variable. For all groups and 
subgroups, there is a significant difference in the annual change in debt ratios for firms that 
pay dividends and firms that retain all profits. 
In order to identify the impact on the balance from dividend payments, we perform 
linear regressions with OLS, using the nominal change in the different liabilities debt, internal 
                                                                                                                                                                      
25 More years of experience with the reform is needed to tell how it will work in the long run.  31 
(earned) equity and external (new) equity from one year to the next as dependent variables. 
As explanatory variables we used time dummies similar to the probit regressions (d01-d06), 
and time dummies multiplied with the annual change in total assets (∆A). In other words, the 
regressions show cross section estimates of each liability’s marginal share of the total change 
in assets plus a constant term, for each year separately. In a slightly different version we also 
include dummy variables for dividend payments and excess dividends payments. For 
example, in table 6 below, new debt accounts for around 75 percent of total change in assets 
in the reference period 2000 (columns 1 and 2) and new equity around 25 percent (columns 
3+5 and  4+6).  The results for closely held firms are reported in table 6 below. More results 
for all corporations sorted by asset values are reported in the appendix tables A.7 and A.8.  
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aChange in assets =DA 
bDummy variable 
*    Significant at 1 percent level. 
**  Significant at 5 percent level. 
***Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
As seen from the dummy variables d01-d04 in tables 6, A.7 and A.8, internal equity 
falls significantly in the years prior to the tax reform. This is in accordance with the pattern of 
dividend payments reported in the probit-analyses and the frequency tables A.1 and A.2. 
Columns 2 and 4 illustrate the significance of excess dividend payments, as the pure time 
effects are reduced when the dummy variable for dividends in excess of profits is introduced. 32 
In the accounting year 2004, the impact on internal equity of the dummy variable for year is 
insignificant when we take into account excess dividends. This is in accordance with the 
transition rule loophole we mentioned in section 3. Based on the OLS results, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that dividend payments did lead to a drain of internal equity out of the 
corporations, according to the tax motive each year. However, the reduction in equity appears 
to be counteracted by a corresponding increase in debt, indicating that there may not be too 
much of a problem for the firms to get external funding. However, we do not know which 
kind of debt this is. It could thus be that part of this increased debt stems from loans from the 
owners, in other words, a conversion from equity to debt
26. The replacement of internal equity 
by debt lead to a significant increase in debt ratios before the tax reform, and as shown by the 
appendix tables A.5 and A.6, the decision not to pay any dividends cause a significant drop in 
debt ratios compared to the decision to pay dividends. This holds for firms of different sizes 
and with different ownership structure. 
After the reform, debt is reduced significantly, as seen from the D05 and D06 
coefficients. This indicates that retained earnings are used to repay loans, possibly given by 
the owners. In 2006, external equity also declines, as repayment of original equity is used as a 
substitute for dividends. This appears to be particularly evident among the large corporations, 
as seen from table A.8. Moreover, payment of large dividends relative to profits seems to 
increase the external equity, indicating that the dividends received are reinvested.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper describes corporations’ early responses to an announced tax reform that is based 
on theoretical principles that to our knowledge are new and untried in practical shareholder 
taxation. These principles imply in an elegant way that a more equal taxation of shareholder 
income and wage income is obtained without introducing investment distortions, undesirable 
financing incentives or adverse effects on foreign investments. Also, the tax system is 
compatible with Norway’s international obligations through the EU and international tax 
agreements.  Finally, it appears to be more capable of collecting tax revenue from the national 
corporate sector than the old split model. If successful, the shareholder income tax with RRA 
                                                      
26 There are also other indications that a large proportion of extraordinary dividends were channelled back to the corporations 
as external equity or debt. New statistic from Statistics Norway based on national accounts estimates that 73 percent of 
dividends received by households and non-profit organizations in 2005 were reinvested in the corporate sector, either as 
debt or equity. Also, according to an official statement from the tax authorities allocated dividends did not need to be 
actually paid out, but could instead be converted directly into debt (to the owner).        33 
could be adopted by other countries too, which makes a closer investigation of the experiment 
interesting not only with regard to national considerations. 
  Our most important finding is that the timing of dividend payments appear to be very 
sensitive to changes in the taxation of shareholders, and that corporations with concentrated 
ownership have the strongest responses. In addition, extraordinarily high dividend payouts 
compared to after tax profits have taken place, accompanied by an increase in debt-equity 
ratios. This trend is especially pronounced among the relatively small and closely held firms. 
The timing effect on dividend payments around the introduction of the shareholder 
income tax in 2006 was not only expected, but also arranged for by the government through 
openness and transitional rules. However, our results indicate that the heavy drop in dividend 
payments in 2006 possibly could involve more than just a timing effect. First, we find a sharp 
increase in corporate equity in the accounting year 2005. In fact, the increase in equity for the 
corporate sector as a whole in this single year was of the same magnitude as the entire 
reduction of equity from 2001 to 2004. Second, it appears from the latest official shareholder 
statistics that dividends continue to be low in the income year 2007, although higher than in 
2006. To some extent, this could reflect that repayment of original equity replaces dividends, 
but the equity ratios still continue to increase.  
  Our results –based on a rather short time period and short experience with the new tax 
system– point out at least three important topics for further research and evaluation of the tax 
reform. First, does the sharp increase in equity ratios after the reform just reflect the timing 
effects and “turbulence” related to the transition or does it also involve a permanent change in 
the funding and payout policy?  If the latter is true, what mechanisms are then at work and 
what will the economic consequences be?  Second, if the re-allocation of dividends from 
individuals to holding companies and the general increase in savings on the hand of the 
corporations simply reflect the ultimate individual owners’ need to trade stocks and rebalance 
their portfolios, this is intended by the legislator and represents no adverse accommodation to 
the reform or breach against the principles of the tax system. However, if owner-managers to 
a large extent use corporations as tax evasion instruments, then it would imply a lower 
effective shareholder income tax and a less successful reform
27. Thus, a careful evaluation of 
the evolution of closely held corporations’ accounting profits and asset composition before 34 
and after the reform should be of great importance. Finally, tax reforms like this create 
exogenous variation in the economic environment that offers an opportunity to analyze firm 
behavior.  In the case of the 2006 tax reform in Norway, we find indications of a negative 
relationship between pay-out ratios and asset growth before the reform. There is a possibility 
that some firms may have balanced tax-motivated equity drain on one hand against the need 
for funds on the other hand. This invites to further research on the role of retentions as a 
preferred source of finance and the importance of financial slack, as originally pointed out by 
Myers and Majluff (1984) and recently by Korinek and Stiglitz (2008). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Percentage of total: Corporations with positive proposed dividends and with excess proposed 
dividends (dividends>After-tax profits), as well as corporations initiating and terminating dividend 
payments compared to previous year. Entire sample, N=76444. 
Year  Div>0 Div>profits  Initiations  Terminations 
1999  35.8 9.7     
2000  29.1 5.1 5.6  12.3 
2001 35.5  13.0  11.8  5.4 
2002 39.5  19.8  10.4  6.3 
2003 40.0  19.4  8.8  8.4 
2004 47.3  26.3  13.1  5.7 
2005 9.3  1.8  1.4  39.5 
2006  19.1 4.7  12.4 2.6 
 
 
Table A.2. Percentage of total: Corporations with positive proposed dividends and with excess proposed 
dividends (dividends>After-tax profits), as well as corporations initiating and terminating dividend 
payments compared to previous year. Closely held corporations, N=38584. 
Year  Div>0 Div>profits  Initiations  Terminations 
1999  41.6 12.1     
2000  33.8 6.1 6.6  14.6 
2001 41.8  16.1  14.1  6.1 
2002 46.6  24.3  12.2  7.4 
2003 46.9  23.5  10.1  9.8 
2004 55.0  31.3  14.8  6.7 
2005 3.2  0.5  0.3  52.1 
2006  15.0 3.8  12.9 1.1 
 
 
Table A.3 Dividend-paying firms by percentage change in dividends. Percent 
All non-listed firms       
Year  Number of firms   <0  0-20 percent  >20 percent 
2000  18005 45.8 24.6 29.6 
2001  18123 25.3 22.7 52.0 
2002  22290 33.8  17 49.2 
2003  23833 48.1 15.9 36.0 
2004  26146 39.4 12.7 47.9 
2005  6001 59.7  15 25.3 
2006  5111 31.6  23 45.4 
      
Closely held firms       
Year  Number of firms   <0  0-20 percent  >20 percent 
2000  10506 48.7 22.8 28.5 
2001  10693 25.5 21.4 53.1 
2002  13529 34.6 16.3 49.1 
2003  14178 49.6 14.9 35.5 
2004  15491 41.2 12.2 46.6 







Table A.4 Results of probit analysis. All corporations,  
Number of observations=589991. 














Log likelihood:    
-160453.4 








Intercept  0.299 0.005 1.271 0.007  -1.866 0.007  -1.529 0.006 
Grow  0.146 0.005 0.218 0.006 0.061 0.006  -0.072 0.007 
Mature  -0.225 0.004  -0.181 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.119 0.005 
Neg  3.243 0.064 3.001 0.138  -2.320 0.078  -0.769 0.012 
d00  0.209 0.007 0.358 0.010  - - - - 
d01  0.017 0.007  -0.172 0.009 0.756 0.009  -0.067 0.009 
d02  -0.099 0.007  -0.466 0.009 0.679 0.009 0.013 0.009 
d03  -0.092 0.007  -0.438 0.009 0.575 0.010 0.151 0.009 
d04  -0.287 0.007  -0.623 0.008 0.813 0.009  -0.053 0.009 
d05  1.329 0.010 1.024 0.016  -0.334 0.016 1.268 0.007 
d05O  -1.006 0.015  -0.560 0.025 0.223 0.030 0.091 0.013 
d05C  -0.558 0.017  -0.651 0.029 0.741 0.029  -1.290 0.015 
d06   0.782 0.008 0.547 0.012 0.721 0.010  -0.585 0.013 
d06O  -0.811 0.014  -0.486 0.019 0.324 0.016 0.579 0.022 
d06C  0.127 0.015 0.006 0.022  -0.486 0.018 0.493 0.025 
 
Table A.5. Difference-in-differences of debt ratios by dividends >0/= 0 
All firms with book value > 500,000 NOK 
 
Book value  Dividend decision  Change in debt ratio 
Low-median Div=0  -0.29 
N=31664  Div >0   0.05 
 Diff  -0.34  (***) 
 
Median-9th decile  Div=0  -0.12 
N=67055  Div >0   0.05 
 Diff  -0.18  (***) 
 
Upper decile  Div=0  -0.04 
N=16857  Div >0   0.05 
 Diff  -0.09  (***) 
(***) means significant at 1 percent level, regardless equal or unequal variances 
  
Table A.6 Difference-in-differences of debt ratios by dividends >0/=0 
Closely held firms with book value > 500,000 NOK 
 
Book value  Dividend decision  Change in debt ratio 
Low-median Div=0  -0.32 
N=31434 Div  >0  0.01 
 Diff  -0.33  (***) 
 
Median-9th decile  Div=0  -0.27 
N=46853 Div  >0  -0.01 
 Diff  -0.26  (***) 
 
Upper decile  Div=0  -0.09 
N=12283 Div  >0  -0.01 
 Diff  -0.08  (***) 
(***) means significant at 1 percent level, regardless equal or unequal variances 41 
Table A.7 OLS All corporations, Lower 90 percent  
Number of observations=481600 
 
 
Change in debt 
 
Change in external 
equity 
 
Change in internal 
equity 
 
  (1) 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Intercept 22.6
**  -9.1 10.0  27.3
*  -10.3 4.6 
d01 27.3
**  -12.7 11.9 -14.8  -32.7




**  13.0 -158.6
























*  211.4 






*  0.27 





*  -0.28 





*  -0.01 





*  -0.01 





*  -0.19 





*  -0.16 





*  -0.10 
Dividends>0
 b  - 23.6
**  - -75.9
*  - 47.1 
Dividends>profits 
b   -  473.6
*  - 94.2
*  - -551.0 
 
R
2  0.65 0.66 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.19 
 
aChange in assets =DA 
bDummy variable 
*    Significant at 1 percent level. 
**  Significant at 5 percent level. 
***Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Table A.8 OLS All corporations, Upper 10 percent by book value  
Number of observations=53508 
 
 
Change in debt 
 
Change in external 
equity 
 
Change in internal 
equity 
 
  (1) 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Intercept -5719.9
***  -6933.0
**  2268.7 3442.3 3075.4 3251.7 
d01 8240.0
***  6913.1 -4390.3 -4159.3 -3235.0 -2367.7 
d02 3762.0  1325.0  -685.2  -416.0  -4379.3  -2687.0 
d03 -1845.0  -4533.3  3396.6  3707.7  -2448.5  -590.8 
d04 18252.0
*  14194.0
*  4016.0 4523.8  -8993.9
*  -6214.1
** 
d05 3121.1  3500.9  -5750.3
**  -6188.4
**  3004.9 2995.0 
d06 -201.3  -445.6  -4444.9  -4473.8  5023.0  5228.7 
Change in assets 
a  0.86
*  0.86
*  0.0 0.0  0.07
*  0.07
* 




*  -0.01 -0.01 











*  0.0 0.0 






















 b  - 1205.5 -  -4458.5
**  - 1934.2 
Dividends>profits 
b   -  22881.0




2  0.53 0.53 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.06 
 
aChange in assets =DA 
bDummy variable 
*    Significant at 1 percent level. 
**  Significant at 5 percent level. 
***Significant at 10 percent level. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
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